We present a sound and complete model theory for theories of β-reduction with or without η-expansion. We then show in what conditions we obtain models of β-equality and βη-equality.
Introduction
We extend the method of [GG10] by which we are able to interpret λ-terms compositionally on 'possible world' structures. The simplicity of the structures is striking, moreover, they provide us with a surprising richness of interpretations of function abstraction and application. Our primary goal is to show how the models can differentiate between extensional and intensional λ-equality, and provide semantic characterisation (i.e. completeness) theorems for both. We shall then hint at how richer λ-languages can be interpreted.
The key idea in this paper is a class of models, presented in Section 2.2, although an important syntactic consideration is required first in Section 2.1. These ideas bear some similarity to the reduction models of [Sel03] in that they get us as far as λ-reduction only. Then, in Section 4 we make use of the results of the earlier sections to provide a characterisation theorem for λ-equality (both with and without η-equality, i.e. extensional and intensional). We can then use this characterisation to comment on the issue of order-incompleteness.
2 The models, computation, logic 2.1 The language and logic Definition 2.1. Fix a countably infinite set of variables.
Define a language L λ of λ-terms by: We now turn to λ-reduction. We shall define a basic relation on terms that follows the familiar reduction rule of β-contraction. To help with the completeness theorem of Section 3 we will need to consider a conservative extension of the familiar λ-calculus (Definition 2.4). To facilitate the proof that this extension really is conservative (Theorem 2.7), we present the λ-calculus in the non-axiomatic style of [HS08, Def. 1.24]. It is important for us to consider not merely the relation of λ-reduction, but a relation of λ-reduction with assumptions. We do this so we can consider the theory of λ-equality as an extension of the theory of λ-reduction. Our models shall initially model only be sound for β-reduction and η-expansion. We can then begin our characterisation of βη-equality by considering the subclass of these models that also validate β-expansion and η-reduction. We therefore need to define some basic, and familiar, rules of λ-reduction but allow for a set of assumed additional reductions (we do not seek to study the syntactic properties of a general calculus of λ-reduction with assumptions in this paper).
Definition 2.2. Let Γ be a set of pairs of terms of L λ . We define a reduction relation −→ Γ on terms of L λ using Figure 1 . A derivation is a sequence of terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that t i −→ Γ t i+1 for each 1 ≤ i < n. t ::= x | λx.t | t·t | t * t Definition 2.5. Let Γ be a set of pairs of terms of L λ (not L * λ ). Define a reduction relation =⇒ Γ on terms of L * λ using Figure 2 . Again, a derivation is a sequence of terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that t i =⇒ Γ t i+1 for each 1 ≤ i < n. 
Remark 2.9. Subsets of W will serve as denotations of λ-terms (Definition 2.12) and H ⊆ P(W ) ('H' for 'Henkin') plays a similar role to the structure of Henkin models for higher-order logic [BBK04, Hen50, Sha00] . This makes our completeness results possible and is a famous issue for second-and higher-order logics. Powersets are too large; for completeness results to be possible we must cut them down -at least when we quantify. This is why in Definition 2.12, the binders restrict quantification from P(W ) down to H. The reader familiar with modal logic can think of • and • as ternary 'accessibility relations' R • and R • such that R • w 1 w 2 w 3 if and only if w 3 ∈ w 1 • w 2 (and similarly for R • ). We can also think of • and • as non-deterministic 'application' operations, but note that intensional frames are not applicative structures -an applicative structure would map W × W to W , whereas in the case of intensional frames, W × W maps to P(W ).
Definition 2.10. Let F = (W, •, •, H) be an intensional frame and S 1 , S 2 ⊆ W and w ∈ W . Then the functions • and • induce functions from W × P(W ) and P(W ) × P(W ) to P(W ) by: w • S = {w • w | w ∈ S} and S 1 • S 2 = {w 1 • w 2 | w 1 ∈ S 1 , w 2 ∈ S 2 } (and similarly for •).
Definition 2.11. Suppose F = (W, •, •, H) is a frame. A valuation (to F ) is a map from variables to sets of worlds (elements of P(W )) that are in H. v will range over valuations.
If x is a variable, h ∈ H, and v is a valuation, then write v[x → h] for the valuation mapping x to h and mapping y to v(y) for any other y.
Definition 2.12. Define the denotation of t inductively by:
Remark 2.13. By elementary set theory:
} We are particularly interested in frames where the denotation of every λ-term is a member of H. This is because Definition 2.12 interprets λ as a kind of quantifier over all members of H. β-reduction then becomes a form of universal instantiation and so requires that every possible instantiation (i.e. every term denotation) is a member of H. Definition 2.14. A frame is faithful when for every v and every t,
Lemma 2.15.
If x is not free in t, then for any
Proof. Both parts follow by easy inductions on t.
Theorem 2.16. If we interpret −→ Γ as subset inclusion then all the rules of Figure 2 are sound for faithful intensional frames.
Proof. By routine calculations from the definitions. See the technical appendix A.2
Soundness
Definition 2.17. − A model M is a pair F, v where F is a faithful intensional frame and v is a valuation on
− Say a frame F is Γ-sensitive if F, v is Γ-sensitive for every v.
Remark 2.18. We could have defined a model as a pair F, v where
v ∈ H for every t. But since the completeness theorem 3.9 holds for the stronger notion of a model we shall use that.
Lemma 2.19.
• and • are monotone. That is,
for any h, and similarly for •.
Proof. Theorem 2.16 entails that each rule of Figure 2 holds in all models, and by definition, if
v in all Γ-sensitive models. The result then follows by Lemma 2.20.
Completeness for λ-reduction
We must show that if t −→ Γ s then there is a Γ-sensitive model M where
We first show that t =⇒ Γ s implies such an M exists if t, s ∈ L λ , and then we appeal to Theorem 2.7.
First we add infinitely many new constant symbols c 1 , c 2 . . . to the language L * λ . Since the language is countable we can enumerate its terms t 1 , t 2 . . . , which may contain the new constants, and the new constants alone c 1 , c 2 . . . . We describe a one-one function f from terms to constants. f (t i ) = c j where j is the least number such that j > i and c j does not occur in t i nor is the value under f of any t k for k < i.
Thus f is a one-one function that assigns a distinct 'fresh' constant to each term of the language. Thus f (t) is a constant that 'names' t. These play the role of witness constants in the construction of the canonical frame in Theorem 3.7. The f (t) also help us carry out inductions on the size of λ-terms, as t[x/f (s)] is smaller than λx.t even if t[x/s] might not be.
Γ s and neither s or t contain any of the new constants c 1 , c 2 . . . , then t =⇒ Γ s.
Proof. f is defined in terms of an enumeration such that r always precedes f (r). Thus if we repeatedly substitute each instance of f (r) with r in a derivation, eventually all will be eliminated. But then instances of (ass) Theorem 3.7. Let F λ be the canonical intensional λ-frame (Definition 3.4) and let v(r) = r for any variable or constant r. Then for any term t,
Proof. By induction on t we show that w ∈ t (i.e. v on the canonical frame F λ . Furthermore, by Lemma 3.8, F λ is faithful, and since r 1 ⊆ r 2 for r 1 , r 2 ∈ Γ it follows that M λ = F λ , v is Γ-sensitive. Proof. For the left-right direction it is a simple matter to apply the reasoning of Theorem 2.21. For the right-left direction it is enough to note that:
so in the construction of the canonical frame F λ of Theorem 3.7,
Remark 3.12. An extensional frame satisfies η-expansion. An intensional frame is like an extensional frame except with an additional 'inner' application function. We interpret λ in terms of the outer function and application in terms of the inner function to block η-expansion. η-expansion will prove very useful in constructing models of λ-equality in Section 4. But others have also noted good properties and justification in models for η-expansion [JG95] .
4 Equality Corollary 4.2. When restricted to L λ , =⇒ β β β is the familiar relation of (intensional) λ-equality, and by Theorem 3.9 is complete for β β β-sensitive models.
Corollary 4.2 is itself not so significant as it only tells us half the story about what these models look like, and does not tell us if there are any non-trivial ones. Of course, given independent nontriviality proofs for λ-equality, 1 we can use Theorem 3.9 to conclude that there are nontrivial β β β-sensitive models. This section is concerned with producing a purely semantic characterisation of β β β-sensitivity.
The strategy we shall employ is as follows. First we extend L λ and L * λ with two constant symbols S, K and C. We will use these symbols to stand in for constructions involving λ-expressions. So for example K·z will stand in for (λxλy.x)·z, and the former expression contains no instances of λ. This will allow us to work with certain complex λ-expressions as if they are free of the symbol λ and is particularly useful for a stronger form of induction which we shall use. Then, for each t we describe a new term [x] t, built only out of application and the three new constants (effectively the familiar combinator abstraction of [HS08, p.26] , but extended to a language that includes the λ-operator). Then, with the help of the completeness theorem 3.9, we describe conditions in which a model ( Definition 4.5. For any t ∈ L λ C , define [x] t by induction on (l, d).
(a)
In this definition we allow the case that z = x in the clause for [x]λz.s. (1) is well defined, (2) contains no instances of λ, and (3) contains no free occurrences of x.
Proof. By induction on (l, d).
Proof. By induction on (l, d). See the technical appendix A.5.
Definition 4.8. Extend the notion of a valuation from Definition 2.11 so that 
A frame F is combinator complete when it is faithful and each F, v is combinator complete.
Remark 4.11. Notice that no h ∈ H can be empty if F is a non-trivial combinator complete frame.
] v = ∅ for any t, s and v. We could have equivalently defined combinator complete frame by requiring that, for any v and any x, y, z,
v . But 4.10 is preferable as it is independent of the syntax.
Theorem 4.12. For any combinator complete
Proof. Again, we proceed by induction on (l, d v in the canonical model for βη βη βη, it is not hard to verify that it is combinator complete and fully extensional.
Further Work
There are numerous other semantics for untyped λ-calculus, and it is a matter of great interest to compare them to the one given here. A detailed comparison is not possible in this paper, but a few key differences can be noted. The semantics of this paper is complete. Unlike e.g. Scott models [HS08, Ch.16], we interpret the λ-operator directly. That is, we do not merely present an extensional combinatory algebra that only interprets application and the combinators S and K. The models and frames of this semantics are ordered, but do not necessarily have a bottom element (the canonical model provides a denotation for each term, and there is no 'bottom' term). Finally, we can distinguish intensional from extensional λ-equality semantically. The characterisation of equality offered by Section 4 is still lacking in providing guidance for explicitly constructing a nontrivial model of lambda equality. We know that λ-calculus is not trivial, so we can use Theorem 3.9 to conclude that such a model exists. But it would be valuable to construct and compare models of intensional and extensional λ-equality.
Finally, the semantics of this paper potentially provides a new framework for obtaining semantics for 'non-standard' λ-calculi. By altering the structure of frames and the semantic definition 2.12 we can validate and invalidate different reduction and equality rules. Of particular interest are frames where H is as close to P(W ) as possible, and the behaviour of λ-terms interpreted in these frames is determined by structural properties of • and •. This relates to the issue mentioned above of explicitly constructing a nontrivial model within this framework. It is preferable to construct one where H is a simple as possible, perhaps isomorphic to P(W ), (see 4.11 for a reason not to make H = P(W )). Carrying such a construction through is a natural next step.
A Technical Appendix
A.1 Theorem 2.7
Suppose that t 1 =⇒ Γ t 2 , where t 1 , t 2 ∈ L λ . We argue that any such derivation can be converted into a derivation that t 1 −→ Γ t 2 .
We first argue that any application of (η * ) or (sub) can be pushed in front of (i.e. towards the end of the derivation) an application of any other rule or eliminated entirely. It follows that any derivation may be replaced by a derivation where the last application is an instance of (η) or (sub), if either appears in the derivation at all. Since (η) and (sub) introduce an instance of * , if t 2 ∈ L λ then no instances of (η) or (sub) occur in the derivation. Furthermore, since t 1 ∈ L λ it follows that the derivation contains no instances of (β * ) or occurrences of * . This implies that t 1 −→ Γ t 2 .
